The Strait facts

Diogenes

Nemo me impune lacessit
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UNCLOS transit passage is the regime governing navigation through straits used for international navigation. It is set out in Part III (Articles 37–44) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Core Concept​

Transit passage is the right of ships and aircraft to continuous and expeditious passage through a strait that connects one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to another part of the high seas or an EEZ.

It is deliberately broader and more protective of freedom of navigation than the “innocent passage” regime that applies in ordinary territorial seas.

Key Features​

1. Right of transit passage (Article 38)

  • All ships and aircraft (including warships, submarines, and military aircraft) enjoy the right of transit passage.
  • Passage must be continuous and expeditious.
  • Submarines may transit submerged (they do not have to surface and show their flag, as they must in ordinary territorial seas under innocent passage).
  • Aircraft may overfly the strait.
2. Non-suspendable: Coastal states may not suspend, impede, or hamper transit passage (Article 44). This is a major difference from innocent passage, which coastal states can temporarily suspend for security reasons.

3. Duties of ships and aircraft in transit (Article 39)While exercising the right, vessels and aircraft must:

  • Proceed without delay.
  • Refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of the coastal states.
  • Refrain from any activities other than those incidental to normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit (unless rendered necessary by force majeure or distress).
  • Comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures, and practices for safety at sea and for the prevention of pollution.
  • Aircraft must observe the Rules of the Air and monitor the appropriate radio frequency.
4. Rights and duties of coastal states (Articles 41–42): Coastal states may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage in respect of:

  • Safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic (including traffic separation schemes).
  • Prevention, reduction, and control of pollution.
  • Prevention of fishing.
  • Loading or unloading of any commodity, currency, or person in contravention of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws.
These laws must:

  • Be non-discriminatory.
  • Not have the practical effect of denying, hampering, or impairing the right of transit passage.
  • Be given due publicity.
  • Conform to generally accepted international standards where relevant (especially for pollution and safety of navigation).
Coastal states may also designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes, but these must first be referred to the competent international organization (normally the International Maritime Organization) for adoption.

5. No charges for mere passage: Coastal states may not levy charges on foreign ships merely by reason of their passage through the strait. They may only charge for specific services rendered to the ship (e.g., pilotage, towage, or other services actually provided).

Transit Passage vs. Innocent Passage​

FeatureTransit Passage (Straits)Innocent Passage (Territorial Sea)
ScopeStraits used for international navigationOrdinary territorial seas
SubmarinesMay remain submergedMust surface and show flag
AircraftRight of overflightNo right of overflight
SuspensionCannot be suspendedCan be temporarily suspended
Activities allowedContinuous & expeditious transitPassage that is not prejudicial to peace, good order, or security
ChargesOnly for specific servicesOnly for specific services


Application to the Strait of Hormuz​



The Strait of Hormuz is used for international navigation to which the transit passage regime applies (or would apply as customary international law, even for non-parties such as Iran). Because the strait is less than 24 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, the territorial seas of Iran and Oman meet or overlap, leaving no high-seas corridor. The transit passage rules are therefore the primary legal framework that protects free navigation through it.

In short: transit passage prioritizes the continuous, unimpeded flow of international shipping and aviation through critical chokepoints while still allowing the bordering states limited regulatory authority that does not undermine that freedom.
 
UNCLOS transit passage is the regime governing navigation through straits used for international navigation. It is set out in Part III (Articles 37–44) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Core Concept​

Transit passage is the right of ships and aircraft to continuous and expeditious passage through a strait that connects one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to another part of the high seas or an EEZ.

It is deliberately broader and more protective of freedom of navigation than the “innocent passage” regime that applies in ordinary territorial seas.

Key Features​

1. Right of transit passage (Article 38)

  • All ships and aircraft (including warships, submarines, and military aircraft) enjoy the right of transit passage.
  • Passage must be continuous and expeditious.
  • Submarines may transit submerged (they do not have to surface and show their flag, as they must in ordinary territorial seas under innocent passage).
  • Aircraft may overfly the strait.
2. Non-suspendable: Coastal states may not suspend, impede, or hamper transit passage (Article 44). This is a major difference from innocent passage, which coastal states can temporarily suspend for security reasons.

3. Duties of ships and aircraft in transit (Article 39)While exercising the right, vessels and aircraft must:

  • Proceed without delay.
  • Refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of the coastal states.
  • Refrain from any activities other than those incidental to normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit (unless rendered necessary by force majeure or distress).
  • Comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures, and practices for safety at sea and for the prevention of pollution.
  • Aircraft must observe the Rules of the Air and monitor the appropriate radio frequency.
4. Rights and duties of coastal states (Articles 41–42): Coastal states may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage in respect of:

  • Safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic (including traffic separation schemes).
  • Prevention, reduction, and control of pollution.
  • Prevention of fishing.
  • Loading or unloading of any commodity, currency, or person in contravention of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws.
These laws must:

  • Be non-discriminatory.
  • Not have the practical effect of denying, hampering, or impairing the right of transit passage.
  • Be given due publicity.
  • Conform to generally accepted international standards where relevant (especially for pollution and safety of navigation).
Coastal states may also designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes, but these must first be referred to the competent international organization (normally the International Maritime Organization) for adoption.

5. No charges for mere passage: Coastal states may not levy charges on foreign ships merely by reason of their passage through the strait. They may only charge for specific services rendered to the ship (e.g., pilotage, towage, or other services actually provided).

Transit Passage vs. Innocent Passage​

FeatureTransit Passage (Straits)Innocent Passage (Territorial Sea)
ScopeStraits used for international navigationOrdinary territorial seas
SubmarinesMay remain submergedMust surface and show flag
AircraftRight of overflightNo right of overflight
SuspensionCannot be suspendedCan be temporarily suspended
Activities allowedContinuous & expeditious transitPassage that is not prejudicial to peace, good order, or security
ChargesOnly for specific servicesOnly for specific services


Application to the Strait of Hormuz​



The Strait of Hormuz is used for international navigation to which the transit passage regime applies (or would apply as customary international law, even for non-parties such as Iran). Because the strait is less than 24 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, the territorial seas of Iran and Oman meet or overlap, leaving no high-seas corridor. The transit passage rules are therefore the primary legal framework that protects free navigation through it.

In short: transit passage prioritizes the continuous, unimpeded flow of international shipping and aviation through critical chokepoints while still allowing the bordering states limited regulatory authority that does not undermine that freedom.
Outstanding and the basis of any Freedom of Passage doctrine worldwide. Set in International law. It really is time to just wipe out Iran's current government.
 
Outstanding and the basis of any Freedom of Passage doctrine worldwide. Set in International law. It really is time to just wipe out Iran's current government.

I notice the UN (usually beloved by lefties) is nowhere to be seen on this issue.
 
I notice the UN (usually beloved by lefties) is nowhere to be seen on this issue.
Exactly. The most useless organization on this planet. Does not live by its charter, serves zero usefulness to the nations it supposedly represents. Abolish it.
 
Exactly. The most useless organization on this planet. Does not live by its charter, serves zero usefulness to the nations it supposedly represents. Abolish it.

THE USA doesn't have that power. We could leave it, but the left would only stand for that if Democrat POTUS did it.
 
Hey Legend, what exactly would Trump need to do to get America out of the U.N.? I understand
that the current leadership heads of the U.N. are third world nation leaders that have nothing but contempt for America. I believe that Trump himself would just soon have America leave that
institution.
 
Hey Legend, what exactly would Trump need to do to get America out of the U.N.? I understand
that the current leadership heads of the U.N. are third world nation leaders that have nothing but contempt for America. I believe that Trump himself would just soon have America leave that
institution.


The UN Charter has no formal withdrawal provision, so there is no clean, automatic “exit button.” Getting the United States fully out of the United Nations itself (not just selected agencies or programs) would require a combination of domestic legal steps and a political assertion of sovereignty that the UN system has never fully tested.


Core legal realities​


  • The UN Charter (a treaty the U.S. ratified in 1945 via the Senate) contains no article allowing a member state to resign. Expulsion under Article 6 is possible in theory for persistent Charter violations, but it requires a Security Council recommendation (where the U.S. holds a veto) plus a two-thirds General Assembly vote. No state has ever been expelled.
  • Indonesia temporarily “withdrew” in 1965 and was treated as inactive rather than gone; it resumed participation in 1966 without reapplying. That is the closest historical precedent, and it was handled politically, not through a formal legal exit.
  • Under customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (which the U.S. has not fully ratified but often follows as custom), unilateral withdrawal from a treaty with no exit clause is difficult unless there is a fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus). The UN would almost certainly not recognize a pure unilateral U.S. exit as legally terminating membership obligations.

What a president (including Trump) can do unilaterally or with limited process​


  • Cease participation and funding for specific UN entities: This is already happening. Presidents have withdrawn from or defunded individual bodies (WHO, UNESCO, Human Rights Council, UNRWA, etc.). In January 2026 the Trump administration directed withdrawal from dozens of UN-related entities and programs “to the extent permitted by law,” treating “withdrawal” for many as stopping participation and funding rather than formal treaty exit. Assessed contributions to the core UN regular budget and peacekeeping remain legal obligations under the Charter while the U.S. is still a member.
  • Withhold dues: The U.S. can (and has) accumulate arrears. Under Article 19, a member loses its General Assembly vote if arrears equal or exceed two years of assessments. This does not end membership.
  • Close the U.S. Mission to the UN and stop sending diplomats: Feasible as an executive action, but it does not erase membership status or treaty obligations.
  • Terminate the Headquarters Agreement: The 1947 agreement hosting the UN in New York was approved by Congress. A president could give notice to terminate it (subject to any notice periods and congressional involvement), which would force the UN to relocate its headquarters. This is a major practical lever but does not itself end U.S. membership.

Presidential power to withdraw from Senate-ratified treaties is contested. Courts have never definitively settled it (Goldwater v. Carter left the issue largely non-justiciable). Practice has often allowed unilateral presidential withdrawal when the treaty itself permits it or when Congress has acquiesced, but pure Charter withdrawal is different because the Charter has no exit clause and membership is foundational.


What would actually be required for a clean, full exit​


Full termination of U.S. membership in the United Nations proper would almost certainly need congressional action, specifically:


  1. Repeal of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (the statute that authorized U.S. membership and participation).
  2. Repeal or termination of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement Act.
  3. Explicit statutory direction that the President shall terminate all U.S. membership in the UN and its organs/specialized agencies, close the Mission, and end funding (except transitional costs).
  4. Notification to the UN Secretary-General of the U.S. decision to withdraw/terminate membership.

Bills doing essentially this have been introduced repeatedly (American Sovereignty Restoration Act versions by Ron Paul and others; the DEFUND Act / Disengaging Entirely From the United Nations Debacle Act in recent Congresses). They repeal the Participation Act, order the President to terminate membership, close the Mission, withdraw from the headquarters agreement, and bar re-entry without new Senate advice and consent. None have become law.


Even after domestic legislation, the UN system and other members would treat the action as a political rupture rather than a clean legal termination. The U.S. would still face residual obligations (financial arrears, etc.) and practical consequences (loss of Security Council permanent seat and veto, exclusion from UN processes, relocation of the headquarters, etc.). Rejoining later would require a new application and the normal admission process (Security Council recommendation + General Assembly vote).

Bottom line​


A president can dramatically reduce U.S. engagement, defund large parts of the system, leave specialized agencies and programs, and create enormous practical pressure. Completely exiting the United Nations itself is not something a president can do with a single executive order or letter the way one leaves the WHO or Paris Agreement. It requires Congress to repeal the foundational domestic statutes and the political will to force a break that the Charter never contemplated. That is the precise sequence needed.



 
The UN Charter has no formal withdrawal provision, so there is no clean, automatic “exit button.” Getting the United States fully out of the United Nations itself (not just selected agencies or programs) would require a combination of domestic legal steps and a political assertion of sovereignty that the UN system has never fully tested.


Core legal realities​


  • The UN Charter (a treaty the U.S. ratified in 1945 via the Senate) contains no article allowing a member state to resign. Expulsion under Article 6 is possible in theory for persistent Charter violations, but it requires a Security Council recommendation (where the U.S. holds a veto) plus a two-thirds General Assembly vote. No state has ever been expelled.
  • Indonesia temporarily “withdrew” in 1965 and was treated as inactive rather than gone; it resumed participation in 1966 without reapplying. That is the closest historical precedent, and it was handled politically, not through a formal legal exit.
  • Under customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (which the U.S. has not fully ratified but often follows as custom), unilateral withdrawal from a treaty with no exit clause is difficult unless there is a fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus). The UN would almost certainly not recognize a pure unilateral U.S. exit as legally terminating membership obligations.

What a president (including Trump) can do unilaterally or with limited process​


  • Cease participation and funding for specific UN entities: This is already happening. Presidents have withdrawn from or defunded individual bodies (WHO, UNESCO, Human Rights Council, UNRWA, etc.). In January 2026 the Trump administration directed withdrawal from dozens of UN-related entities and programs “to the extent permitted by law,” treating “withdrawal” for many as stopping participation and funding rather than formal treaty exit. Assessed contributions to the core UN regular budget and peacekeeping remain legal obligations under the Charter while the U.S. is still a member.
  • Withhold dues: The U.S. can (and has) accumulate arrears. Under Article 19, a member loses its General Assembly vote if arrears equal or exceed two years of assessments. This does not end membership.
  • Close the U.S. Mission to the UN and stop sending diplomats: Feasible as an executive action, but it does not erase membership status or treaty obligations.
  • Terminate the Headquarters Agreement: The 1947 agreement hosting the UN in New York was approved by Congress. A president could give notice to terminate it (subject to any notice periods and congressional involvement), which would force the UN to relocate its headquarters. This is a major practical lever but does not itself end U.S. membership.

Presidential power to withdraw from Senate-ratified treaties is contested. Courts have never definitively settled it (Goldwater v. Carter left the issue largely non-justiciable). Practice has often allowed unilateral presidential withdrawal when the treaty itself permits it or when Congress has acquiesced, but pure Charter withdrawal is different because the Charter has no exit clause and membership is foundational.


What would actually be required for a clean, full exit​


Full termination of U.S. membership in the United Nations proper would almost certainly need congressional action, specifically:


  1. Repeal of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (the statute that authorized U.S. membership and participation).
  2. Repeal or termination of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement Act.
  3. Explicit statutory direction that the President shall terminate all U.S. membership in the UN and its organs/specialized agencies, close the Mission, and end funding (except transitional costs).
  4. Notification to the UN Secretary-General of the U.S. decision to withdraw/terminate membership.

Bills doing essentially this have been introduced repeatedly (American Sovereignty Restoration Act versions by Ron Paul and others; the DEFUND Act / Disengaging Entirely From the United Nations Debacle Act in recent Congresses). They repeal the Participation Act, order the President to terminate membership, close the Mission, withdraw from the headquarters agreement, and bar re-entry without new Senate advice and consent. None have become law.


Even after domestic legislation, the UN system and other members would treat the action as a political rupture rather than a clean legal termination. The U.S. would still face residual obligations (financial arrears, etc.) and practical consequences (loss of Security Council permanent seat and veto, exclusion from UN processes, relocation of the headquarters, etc.). Rejoining later would require a new application and the normal admission process (Security Council recommendation + General Assembly vote).

Bottom line​


A president can dramatically reduce U.S. engagement, defund large parts of the system, leave specialized agencies and programs, and create enormous practical pressure. Completely exiting the United Nations itself is not something a president can do with a single executive order or letter the way one leaves the WHO or Paris Agreement. It requires Congress to repeal the foundational domestic statutes and the political will to force a break that the Charter never contemplated. That is the precise sequence needed.



Thanks, but it seems a bit complicated. Looks like congress would have the last word, or the last vote on getting America out of that shithole.
 
Looks like congress would have the last word, or the last vote on getting America out of that shithole.

Yes. For a clean, definitive end to U.S. membership in the United Nations itself, Congress would have the last word.


U.S. participation rests on statutes Congress passed, not solely on the President’s foreign-affairs powers or the UN Charter. The key ones are:


  • The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, which authorized U.S. membership, representation, and participation.
  • The United Nations Headquarters Agreement Act (1947), which approved hosting the UN in New York.

Bills that actually aim to get the United States fully out (the various American Sovereignty Restoration Acts and the more recent DEFUND Act) all do the same core things: repeal those statutes, direct the President to terminate membership, close the U.S. Mission, and end the headquarters arrangement. That is the mechanism that creates a clear domestic legal break.


Why Congress holds the decisive vote​


  • The UN Charter itself has no withdrawal clause. A pure presidential announcement or letter does not cleanly sever membership under international law or in the eyes of other members.
  • Presidential power to withdraw from Senate-ratified treaties is still unsettled constitutionally (the Supreme Court ducked the issue in Goldwater v. Carter). Practice has often allowed unilateral presidential exits from treaties that do contain withdrawal clauses, but the UN Charter is different, and membership is intertwined with domestic authorizing statutes.
  • Only Congress can repeal those statutes. Without that repeal, the legal foundation for membership remains on the books even if a president stops funding agencies, withholds dues, or closes the mission.
  • Congress has already asserted similar authority in other contexts. The 2024 NDAA, for example, bars the President from withdrawing from the North Atlantic Treaty without Senate advice and consent or an Act of Congress. That shows Congress believes it can set the terms of exit from major treaty-based organizations.

What a president can do without Congress​


A president can (and recent administrations have) sharply reduce involvement: withdraw from specialized agencies and programs, stop voluntary and some assessed funding “to the extent permitted by law,” close or scale back the mission, and create practical pressure. Those steps are real and consequential. They do not, however, fully terminate U.S. membership in the United Nations or erase the Charter obligations that flow from it while the domestic statutes remain in force.


In short: the President can drive the process and take many unilateral steps, but Congress has the last vote on the statutes that actually authorize membership. Without congressional action repealing those laws and directing termination, a full legal and practical exit remains incomplete.
 
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