America has been humbled; their supply lines have been cut

مرگ بر آمریکا

مرگ بر آمریکا

سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی
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Diego Garcia doesn't even appear on this map, it's so far away in the wrong direction from the area of operations, multiplying delivery times to and from US bases in Europe and America.
 
Tyrant Trump can command aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups to move to the other side of the globe.

But he can't order food, fuel, munitions or supplies to appear out of the ether, in the absence of having a logistical chain already in place to sustain his forces of evil, can he?
 
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The world’s oil reserves are rapidly being depleted, with crude inventories poised to reach the lowest levels on record even if tyrant Trump abandons his blockade by the end of this month.
 
Jake Starkey said:
American supply lines are open and safe.
Click to expand...

Bluster.

Now that the US war machine has been expelled from the Persian Gulf, it must be sustained via fragile and expensive transshipments from
the USA to Diego Garcia, whose physical distance and port constraints are obviously insufficient.

How many nautical miles are consumed in this"open and safe" route?

What costs are imposed thereby upon the hapless citizens of your aggressor nation?

Even American "allies" are increasingly unwilling to allow the piratical US Navy to utilize their port facilities.
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said:
Tyrant Trump can command aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups to move to the other side of the globe.

But he can't order food, fuel, munitions or supplies to appear out of the ether, in the absence of having a logistical chain already in place to sustain his forces of evil, can he?
Click to expand...

Your a crackup, Baghdad Bob.
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said:
Bluster.

Now that the US war machine has been expelled from the Persian Gulf, it must be sustained via fragile and expensive transshipments from
the USA to Diego Garcia, whose physical distance and port constraints are obviously insufficient.

How many nautical miles are consumed in this"open and safe" route?

What costs are imposed thereby upon the hapless citizens of your aggressor nation?

Even American "allies" are increasingly unwilling to allow the piratical US Navy to utilize their port facilities.
Click to expand...
:rofl2:Uh-huh.
 
Chat GPT has searched independent regional reporting and commercial satellite-analytics indexes for March–April 2026 and could not find a publicly available, independently verifiable satellite image showing U.S. warships alongside the Mina Salman/NSA Bahrain quays for quayside resupply in that period.

Sources that report on attacks and port damage reference no Mina Salman logistical activity, but independent satellite-analytic publications or open AIS records published by non-U.S. commercial providers do not show a confirmed quayside resupply event there since March 2026.

America's supply line is clearly unequal to the task of resupplying three carrier groups.
 
Chat GPT has compiled a concise list (port times included) of the logistics requirements, constraints, and cost drivers to sustain three carrier strike groups (CSGs) from Diego Garcia (DG).

  1. Aggregate daily demand (3 CSGs)
    • Fuel: ~1,200 t/day
    • Stores/ordnance: ~36 t/day
  2. Key nodes and legs
    • CONUS → Diego Garcia sea transit: ~14 days one‑way
    • Diego Garcia → operating area (Arabian Sea/near Strait of Hormuz): ~9 days one‑way
    • Diego Garcia quay/port ops: ~2.5 days average per visit
    • CONUS port loading time (tankers/RO‑RO): ~3.5 days average
  3. Required afloat lift (steady‑state, DG-reload model)
    • AORs (replenishment oilers) on rotation: ~3 ships (each ~12,000 t fuel payload)
    • Shuttle tankers to DG: ~3 tankers (each ~15,000 t payload) rotating to keep DG stocks
    • RO‑RO/container for stores: ~1 ship on ~monthly rotation (5,000 t capacity suffices for multiple months)
  4. Cycle times (representative)
    • AOR round‑trip (DG reload → station → DG): ~22 days (includes 2.5 days DG port ops)
    • Tanker round‑trip (CONUS ↔ DG): ~35 days (includes ~3.5 days port ops each end)
    • RO‑RO round‑trip (CONUS ↔ DG): ~35 days
  5. Ship‑days (approx. monthly)
    • AOR ship‑days: ~90 ship‑days/month (3 AORs × 30)
    • Tanker ship‑days: ~90 ship‑days/month (3 tankers × 30)
    • RO‑RO ship‑days: ~30 ship‑days/month (one ship)
    • Total major supply ship‑days ≈ 210/month
  6. Rough incremental cost drivers (order‑of‑magnitude)
    • AOR operating cost: ~$70k/day → ~$6.3M/month for 3 AORs
    • Tanker/RO‑RO charter/ops: ~$80k/day → ~$9.6M/month (3 tankers + 1 RO‑RO allocated)
    • DG handling, ordnance handling, port fees, transshipment: ~$3–4.5M/month
    • Total incremental monthly sustainment cost: ≈ $20–22M/month (≈ $700k/day)
  7. Constraints and operational impacts
    • Longer transit and port-turnaround increase required ship pool and ship‑days.
    • Port times create inventory‑in‑transit requirements and larger buffer stocks at DG.
    • Single‑node risk: DG is distant; disruption significantly degrades sustainment unless additional pre‑positioning or partner ports exist.
    • Surge sensitivity: higher flight ops or consumption rates scale ship counts and costs roughly linearly; doubling consumption roughly doubles required logistics resources.
    • Vulnerabilities: limited pier capacity at DG for heavy ordnance; ordnance transfers require specialist handling and tempo constraints.
 

Iran has caused billions in damage to US military bases in Gulf region​



Iran has caused billions of dollars in damage to U.S. military assets and bases in the Gulf region, sparking questions about the Trump administration’s transparency regarding potential costs for repairs.

Runways, high-end radar systems, dozens of aircraft, warehouses, command headquarters, aircraft hangars and satellite communications infrastructure were struck by Iranian forces.

The destruction spans across several countries in the Middle East and would cost up to $5 billion to repair.

The projected price tag does not include fixes to radar systems, weapons systems, aircraft and other equipment that were either impaired or rendered unsalvageable as a result of Iranian strikes.

Initial damage was caused to U.S. base Camp Buehring in Kuwait by an Iranian F-5 fighter jet within the first few days of the war, which began Feb. 28 with a series of U.S.-Israeli sneak attacks.

Al Dhafra Air Base and Al Ruwais military base in the United Arab Emirates recorded damage to fuel storage, a medical clinic, hangars and barracks in addition to other warehouses and buildings.

Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia; Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan; and Camp Arifjan, Camp Buehring and Shuaiba Port in Kuwait also saw U.S. resources damaged.

Three officials told NBC News there was later extensive damage to the headquarters building for the U.S. Navy in Bahrain and at least two air defense systems.

Repairs to the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet headquarters could total $200 million alone, one congressional official told The New York Times following a Pentagon assessment.

An external assessment from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) shows Iranian forces also struck Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, a runway at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and a munitions storage facility at a military base in northern Iraq, per NBC.

“As part of Epic Fury, the potential future costs to rebuild American military infrastructure overseas may include repair, reconstruction, outright replacement, or even abandonment/decommissioning of locales,” Mackenzie Eaglen, a senior fellow at AEI, told the outlet.

“War damage also includes estimated costs for infrastructure that is unsalvageable,” she added.
 
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