Sooner or later, we're going to have a societal collapse, IMO.
Why do I say this?
Because of the things that leftists promote and the policies they enact when they have the chance.
By that, I mean policies that weaken deterrence, selective non-enforcement, and erosion of equal application of rules have predictably increased disorder.
This follows from basic logic: when the perceived consequences of crime are reduced or eliminated, more of it occurs.
The observation is the core of deterrence theory (specifically general deterrence) in criminology.
It is also known as the economic theory of crime or rational choice model of crime, most commonly associated with Gary Becker’s landmark 1968 paper:
His central point is straightforward: potential criminals weigh the expected benefits of committing a crime against its risks. When the calculation favors gain over risk , the volume of crime rises, all other factors being equal.
I've observed results in multiple U.S. cities that appear to illustrate the pattern more clearly than rhetoric.
Consider the (often Soros-backed) observable results in many Democrat-dominated urban areas"
Policies that explicitly prioritize group equity outcomes over individual conduct (in charging, sentencing, or police discipline) introduce double standards.
Once people perceive that rules will be bent based upon an offender's identity or politics, voluntary compliance falls.
Historical patterns, from 1960s–1970s crime waves after similar reforms to post-2020 city data, track the same mechanism: weaker punishment produces more crime.
The directional effect of lowering the cost of predation and disorder is robust in "progressive" places that have tested these policies.
If this is true, it appears to me that our nation's governmental apparatus is not enough to hold a society together.
Why do I say this?
Because of the things that leftists promote and the policies they enact when they have the chance.
By that, I mean policies that weaken deterrence, selective non-enforcement, and erosion of equal application of rules have predictably increased disorder.
This follows from basic logic: when the perceived consequences of crime are reduced or eliminated, more of it occurs.
The observation is the core of deterrence theory (specifically general deterrence) in criminology.
It is also known as the economic theory of crime or rational choice model of crime, most commonly associated with Gary Becker’s landmark 1968 paper:
His central point is straightforward: potential criminals weigh the expected benefits of committing a crime against its risks. When the calculation favors gain over risk , the volume of crime rises, all other factors being equal.
I've observed results in multiple U.S. cities that appear to illustrate the pattern more clearly than rhetoric.
Consider the (often Soros-backed) observable results in many Democrat-dominated urban areas"
- Cashless or low-cash bail and rapid release policies: These treat many offenses as pretrial detention risks rather than flight or reoffense risks. Repeat offenders are released quickly and reoffend at higher rates while cases pend. Cities that expanded these approaches after 2019–2020 saw measurable rises in theft, robbery, and rearrests among the released population.
- Declining to prosecute categories of “low-level” crime (shoplifting under a dollar threshold, drug possession, fare evasion, trespass, quality-of-life offenses): Progressive prosecutors in several jurisdictions formalized this. Retail theft and open disorder rose where enforcement thresholds effectively legalized the conduct; businesses and residents responded by exiting high-crime zones, accelerating the spiral.
- Reduced proactive policing and “defund”/reallocation efforts: Cutting specialized units, traffic stops, or stop-and-frisk equivalents lowers clearance rates and removes deterrence. Homicide and gun violence spikes in multiple cities after 2020 correlated with reduced officer activity and morale, not solely pandemic effects. Restoring proactive work later reversed parts of the increase.
- Early release, shortened sentences, and parole expansions without tight risk filters: These raise the volume of high-risk individuals returned to communities. Recidivism data consistently show that a small cohort accounts for a large share of serious crime; releasing them early without strong supervision raises victimization.
- Sanctuary policies that restrict local-federal cooperation on criminal aliens: When Democrat-dominated jurisdictions refuse to honor detainers for people already charged with or convicted of serious crimes, those individuals remain free to reoffend locally. Federal data on criminal non-citizens and ICE detainers show repeated arrests for assault, sexual offenses, and homicide after release in non-cooperating jurisdictions. Open or lightly enforced borders compound the volume problem for both criminal and non-criminal illegal entrants.
- Treating public drug use, camping, and disorder primarily as untreated "illness" while deprioritizing enforcement: Blue cities that largely stopped citing or clearing encampments and open drug markets experienced sustained visible disorder, property crime, and public health costs. The absence of consistent consequence removes the pressure that historically pushed many toward treatment or relocation; the result is concentrated zones of lawlessness that spill into surrounding areas.
- Selective non-enforcement during political protests or identity-framed disorder: When arson, assault, or property destruction is met with delayed or diluted charges because of the "cause" being perceived by Democrats as righteous, it sends a signal that rules are contingent upon leftist preferences. This both emboldens participants and demoralizes ordinary residents who face full enforcement for similar infractions.
Policies that explicitly prioritize group equity outcomes over individual conduct (in charging, sentencing, or police discipline) introduce double standards.
Once people perceive that rules will be bent based upon an offender's identity or politics, voluntary compliance falls.
Historical patterns, from 1960s–1970s crime waves after similar reforms to post-2020 city data, track the same mechanism: weaker punishment produces more crime.
The directional effect of lowering the cost of predation and disorder is robust in "progressive" places that have tested these policies.
If this is true, it appears to me that our nation's governmental apparatus is not enough to hold a society together.
