Until recent times, Republicans regularly won the vote of college educated voters, and the Democratic base was heavily working class. Reagan won not only college educated voters he won a majority of voters with advanced degrees.
The Democrats abandoned the working class. Simple as that.
The party’s coalition has inverted along education and class lines. Non-college voters (the most common proxy for the working class) now lean Republican, while college-educated professionals and higher-income voters have become the Democratic core. This is visible in voting data, party identification, geography, and union households.
Why it happened
Multiple factors operated at once:
- Economics and trade: NAFTA, China’s WTO entry, and later TPP were Democratic-led or supported policies that accelerated deindustrialization in the Midwest and South. Manufacturing job losses and wage stagnation for non-college men were real. Biden-era industrial policy (CHIPS, IRA) tried to reverse this but did not restore the old coalition. Working-class voters remain more protectionist than Democratic elites.
- Cultural and priority mismatch: Focus groups and post-2024 Democratic research find working-class voters view the party as “woke, weak, and out-of-touch,” overly focused on social issues rather than paychecks, prices, crime, and borders. Patriotism, self-reliance, and personal security rank higher for these voters than for the party’s college-educated base.
- Coalition and candidate effects: The party’s growing professional-class and urban base changed its incentives and messaging. Trump’s explicit economic nationalism and cultural appeals accelerated the realignment that was already underway. Recent gains among non-white working-class voters show the pattern is not only about white voters.
- Union decline: Membership fell from ~20% of workers in the early 1980s to ~10% today. Unions historically socialized members toward Democrats; their shrinkage removed a key transmission belt.
Thomas Frank’s Listen, Liberal captured an earlier version of this argument: after the 1970s the party increasingly oriented itself around professionals, meritocracy, and “competence” rather than industrial unions and wage solidarity. That description fits the current donor, staff, and activist base even if Democratic platforms still contain redistributionist language.
The lowest-income voters still lean Democratic more than the upper-middle class does in some measures, and Democrats retain advantages among public-sector unions and certain urban working-class pockets. But the larger non-college electorate, the geographic heartland of older industrial regions, and growing shares of Hispanic and Black working-class voters have moved. That is a large-scale abandonment of the party’s mid-20th-century working-class identity, whether measured by votes, identification, or policy priorities.
But I’m missing what any of that has to do with liberal arts.
That's because it has nothing to do with it.