It's Supreme Court Monday!

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Kavanaugh was hired by kagan at I think Harvard? She’ll convert him to a milquetoast cuck in no time.
 
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the lower the score, the more liberal you are.

conservatives need to ALWAYS be on their guard.

once you get folded up into the dc wine drinking clubs, the deep staters lean on you hard. liberals know it is their mission to always be activist and usurp the constition, it's a slow decline for conservatives, so you always need to start at the absolute zenith. kavanaugh is not the zenith. he's good now. will he be good in 10 years?
 
Kavanaugh has been on the appellate court for quite a while,and has a large body of decisions.
He's not going to change. This isn't some recluse like Souter who came to DC and got rolled
 
Irthriuth said:
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the lower the score, the more liberal you are.

conservatives need to ALWAYS be on their guard.

once you get folded up into the dc wine drinking clubs, the deep staters lean on you hard. liberals know it is their mission to always be activist and usurp the constition, it's a slow decline for conservatives, so you always need to start at the absolute zenith. kavanaugh is not the zenith. he's good now. will he be good in 10 years?
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meh.....axiomatic......all of society becomes more liberal as time passes......its called the slippery slope.......
 
PostmodernProphet said:
meh.....axiomatic......all of society becomes more liberal as time passes......its called the slippery slope.......
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if your theory were true you would expect the liberal justices to also get more liberal by similar margins. but they don't. they stay basically where they are.
 
and the reason for that is for a deep level analysis post I've made many times, liberals have culture privilege. they have less pressure to be "good"
 
sorry, folks. I have no joy at the picking of supreme court judges while the DOJ/FBI/ EPA/etc., etc., etc. deepstate is still in control of the us gov.. supreme court justices will be of none effect if the deepstste is not completely rooted out and destroyed. yay. it is not a islamist/ antichrist/ communist SCOTUS placement by Hillary or Bernie. yay.
 
Irthriuth said:
I'm scared now.
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You can't be scared. You're Grind.

Here is a list of Judge Kavanaugh’s dissents, including opinions dissenting in part:

• Island Architectural Woodwork v. NLRB, 892 F.3d 362 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“In light of the relevant law and facts, the Board’s conclusion that Island and Verde were alter egos is not reasonable. I would therefore vacate the Board’s decision. I respectfully dissent.”).

• United States v. Brown, 892 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Because the District Court fully explained the sentence, thus satisfying its procedural obligations, and because the 9-year sentence was substantively reasonable, Matthews’ case should be an easy affirmance.”).

• PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“In other words, the heads of executive agencies are accountable to and checked by the President; and the heads of independent agencies, although not accountable to or checked by the President, are at least accountable to and checked by their fellow commissioners or board members. No independent agency exercising substantial executive authority has ever been headed by a single person. Until now.”). [He was joined by Judge Randolph, who also filed a separate dissent; this dissent uses similar language as the majority opinion Kavanaugh authored in PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir 2016).]

• Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735 (per curiam) (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Today’s majority decision is ultimately based on a constitutional principle as novel as it is wrong: a new right for unlawful immigrant minors in U.S. Government detention to obtain immediate abortion on demand, thereby barring any Government efforts to expeditiously transfer the minors to their immigration sponsors before they make that momentous life decision.”). [He was joined by Judges Henderson and Griffith.]

• Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“The bad news is that the majority opinion—invoking a standard of deference that, as applied here, seems akin to a standard of ‘hold your nose to avoid the stink’—upholds much of the SEC’s decision on liability. I would vacate the SEC’s conclusions as to both sanctions and liability.”).

• Midwest Div.—MMC, LLC v. NLRB, 867 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (stressing that because “the hospital’s confidentiality interest in the requested information is weighty, [and] the Union’s need for that information is minimal at best,” the hospital should not be required to provide the information).

• NLRB v. CNN Am. Inc., 865 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“That raises a natural question: If CNN is a successor employer, why does it matter which way CNN qualifies as a successor employer? Money. Lots of money. As noted above, finding CNN a successor employer under the traditional test would have dramatically different consequences in terms of the remedies available in this case. In particular, under the traditional test, CNN would be subject to an obligation to bargain with the union going forward. Under the discrimination finding, however, CNN could also be liable for tens of millions of dollars of back pay to former TVS employees. Bottom line: In my view, the Board jumped the rails in its analysis of both the joint-employer and the successor-employer issues.”).

• Wash. Alliance of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 857 F.3d 907 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding that an entity’s attorney fees should not have been reduced simply because it raised alternative grounds for relief).

• U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381 (per curiam) (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“The FCC’s 2015 net neutrality rule is one of the most consequential regulations ever issued by any executive or independent agency in the history of the United States. The rule transforms the Internet by imposing common-carrier obligations on Internet service providers and thereby prohibiting Internet service providers from exercising editorial control over the content they transmit to consumers. The rule will affect every Internet service provider, every Internet content provider, and every Internet consumer. The economic and political significance of the rule is vast. The net neutrality rule is unlawful and must be vacated, however, for two alternative and independent reasons.”).

• United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“The majority opinion sees this as a classic horizontal merger case where the high concentration of this market and the merged insurer’s high market share would mean increased prices for the employer-customers. But that understanding misses what I believe is the critical feature of this case. Here, these insurance companies act as purchasing agents on behalf of their employer-customers in the upstream market where the insurers negotiate provider rates for the employer-customers. When the insurers negotiate lower provider rates, those savings go directly to the employer-customers. To be sure, the merged company may charge its employer-customers an increased fee for obtaining those savings. But the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that the cost savings to employers would far exceed any increased fees paid by employers.”).

• John Doe Co. v. CFPB, 849 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Petitioner John Doe Company claims that it is being regulated by an unconstitutionally structured agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The CFPB has issued binding rules that govern the Company’s conduct, and the CFPB can bring enforcement actions against the Company for violations of those rules (or of statutes). Under the Supreme Court’s and this Court’s precedents, the Company as a regulated entity has standing to raise its free-standing constitutional claim, and the claim is ripe. The Company need not wait for a CFPB enforcement action in order to raise the constitutional challenge.”).

• Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 829 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (concluding that the EPA violated “common sense and settled law” when it revoked a Clean Water Act permit by considering only the benefits, and not the costs, of doing so).

• Int’l Union, Sec., Police and Fire Prof’ls of Am. v. Faye, 828 F.3d 969 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“The majority opinion reverses the judgment of the District Court and allows the Union to maintain its federal claim against Faye. I respectfully dissent because unions do not possess a federal cause of action to sue their officers for breaches of fiduciary duties.”).

• Wesby v. District of Columbia, 816 F.3d 96 (per curiam) (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he panel majority says that it agrees with this dissent about the law and that our disagreement with one another is simply about how the law applies to the facts. But that is true in most qualified immunity cases. At a high enough level of generality, the law of qualified immunity is settled, as are the relevant Fourth Amendment principles. But what has concerned the Supreme Court in numerous cases is how lower courts apply the general qualified immunity and Fourth Amendment principles to the facts of particular cases. That is my concern here as well.”).

• Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., 799 F.3d 1035 (per curiam) (D.C. Cir. 2015) (dissenting from a denial of petition for rehearing en banc; “Although the panel opinion reached the correct bottom-line result, the panel opinion’s interpretation of the Origination Clause is incorrect, in my respectful view. The panel opinion alters the longstanding balance of power between the House and Senate, and ultimately affects individual liberty.”) [He was joined by Judges Henderson, Brown, and Griffith.]

• Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA, 787 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“EPA issued a rule that imposes limits on emissions of hazardous air pollutants by manufacturers of polyvinyl chloride. But EPA later concluded that one category of those limits—the so-called wastewater limits on hazardous air pollutants that may be dissolved in wastewater—was based on bad data. EPA is therefore reconsidering the wastewater limits. EPA says that it will complete the reconsideration process in 2016. … Even EPA itself does not oppose a stay in this case. EPA’s position is telling. Given the circumstances here, as well as our Portland Cement precedent, I would stay the wastewater limits pending judicial review.”).

• Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., 808 F.3d 1 (per curiam) (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“In my respectful view, the panel opinion misapplies the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and contradicts the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Wheaton College v. Burwell, and Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius. I would grant rehearing en banc and rule for the plaintiff religious organizations.”).

• Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. CFPB, 785 F.3d 684 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (urging that an attorney has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the CFPB because the CFPB regulates a business the attorney is engaged in).

• Fogo De Chao (Holdings) Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 769 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (concluding that foreign citizenship and cultural background should not qualify as specialized knowledge).

• Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“I would affirm Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction, vacate his material support for terrorism and solicitation convictions as ex post facto violations, and remand to the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review for it to address the consequences, if any, for Bahlul’s life sentence.”).

• White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“To sum up: All significant regulations involve tradeoffs, and I am very mindful that Congress has assigned EPA, not the courts, to make many discretionary calls to protect both our country’s environment and its productive capacity. In this case, if EPA had decided, in an exercise of its judgment, that it was ‘appropriate’ to regulate electric utilities under the MACT program because the benefits outweigh the costs, that decision would be reviewed under a deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review. But before we assess the merits of any cost-benefit balancing, this statutory scheme requires that we first ensure that EPA has actually considered the costs.”).

• SeaWorld of Fla., LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The Department of Labor’s unprecedented assertion of authority to proscribe SeaWorld’s show is triply flawed: First, it departs from longstanding precedent governing the extent of the Department’s authority. Second, it irrationally and arbitrarily distinguishes close contact between [trainers/whales], which the Department still proclaims as exempt from regulation. Third, the decision green-lights the Department to regulate sports and entertainment activities in a way that Congress could not conceivably have intended in 1970 when giving the agency general authority to ensure safer workplaces.”).

• United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining that the majority deviates from Supreme Court precedent that “the defendant in a recidivist sentencing proceeding may be assigned the burden of proof when challenging the constitutionality of a prior conviction that is being used to enhance or determine the current sentence”).

• United States v. Malenya, 736 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“A 41–year–old man sought to have sex with someone he knew to be 14 years old. That is a serious crime. With the one exception described above, I would uphold the special conditions imposed by the District Court. I respectfully dissent.”).

• Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“In sum, EPA did not have authority to disapprove SIPs or to issue FIPs to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases in those States until the expiration of the three-year period set forth in EPA’s regulation. Under that binding EPA regulation, States without automatically updating SIPs are entitled to three years to revise their SIPs to cover greenhouse gases. During that time, States have legal authority to issue valid permits under their existing SIPs. EPA’s orders should therefore be vacated.”).

• Huthnance v. District of Columbia, 722 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Because the missing evidence instruction was not appropriate here and because it was ‘very damaging’ to the defendants, I would vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.”).

• Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The majority opinion holds that key tax-related provisions of the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act may be unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause’s minimum contacts principle. I respectfully disagree. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits. Gordon’s Due Process Clause claim lacks merit. I would therefore vacate the preliminary injunction.”).

• Howard v. Office of Chief Admin. Officer of U.S. House of Representatives, 720 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Put simply, the majority opinion’s test is inconsistent with Speech or Debate Clause principles. Under the Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause, Article I congressional employers cannot be put to this kind of choice by an Article III federal court.”).

• Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 704 F.3d 1005 (per curiam) (D.C. Cir. 2013) (dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc; “The panel’s decision to throw out the suit on standing grounds is mistaken in multiple independent ways, in my respectful view. And the panel’s standing holding is problematic not only because of the erroneous standing law that it creates, but also because it is outcome-determinative in a case with significant economic ramifications for the American food and petroleum industries, as well as for American consumers who will ultimately bear some of the costs.”).

• Moore v. Hartman, 704 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Because the First Amendment law on this point is not clear, the defendants in this case cannot be said to have violated ‘clearly established’ First Amendment law.”).

• Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 2012 WL 6621785 (D.C. Cir 2012) (dissenting from the denials of rehearing en banc; “Allowing agencies to exercise that kind of statutory re-writing authority could significantly enhance the Executive Branch’s power at the expense of Congress’s and thereby alter the relative balance of powers in the administrative process. I would not go down that road.”).

• Miller v. Clinton, 687 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“To be sure, Congress could (and perhaps should) change the law and bar the State Department from imposing mandatory retirement [at age 65]. Moreover, even under existing law, the President, the Secretary of State, and appropriate subordinate officers in the State Department could (and perhaps should) alter the current policy and no longer mandate retirement at age 65 for workers such as Miller. But our job is to apply and enforce the law as it is written. In my judgment, the majority opinion has not correctly performed that task.”).

• United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“In my view, the majority opinion is seriously mistaken because the presumption of mens rea applies to each element of the offense, and the automatic character of the gun is an element of the Section 924(c) offense. Twenty extra years of mandatory imprisonment hangs in the balance. I respectfully but emphatically dissent.”)

• Angellino v. Royal Family Al-Saud, 681 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 688 F.3d 771 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining that the district court was within its discretion to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute).

• Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“If Congress wishes to re-strike the balance between personnel and employment discrimination laws on the one hand and national security on the other, it is free to do so—either broadening or narrowing the scope of the protection for agencies’ security clearance decisions. For that reason, Rattigan’s suit faces an insurmountable bar, and we must dismiss it.”).

• Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees-IAM v. Vilsack, 681 F.3d 483 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“No Supreme Court case has addressed drug testing of teachers or other public school employees. This case likewise does not require us to resolve that broader question because this case raises a far narrower issue: drug testing of public employees at residential public schools for at-risk youth where many of the students have previously used drugs. Applying the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard I would uphold the Department of Agriculture drug testing program”).

• Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 668 F.3d 724 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The company has now appealed and, in the alternative, sought mandamus to overturn the temporary stay. But we do not have appellate jurisdiction. As the majority opinion appears to acknowledge, there is no final order because the company was not placed “effectively out of court,” nor does this case fit within the narrow confines of the collateral order doctrine.”).

• Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“In order for the Affordable Care Act penalties to be assessed and collected ‘in the same manner as taxes,’ the assessment and collection of these Affordable Care Act penalties likewise must be insulated from pre-enforcement suits by the Anti–Injunction Act.”).

• Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“This is a case where emotions run high on both sides of the policy issue because of the vital public safety interests at stake. But our task is to apply the Constitution and the precedents of the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the result is one we agree with as a matter of first principles or policy. As I read the relevant Supreme Court precedents, the D.C. ban on semi-automatic rifles and the D.C. gun registration requirement are unconstitutional and may not be enforced.”).

• Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. , 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Exercising the caution mandated by the Supreme Court in ATS cases, I would dismiss the ATS claims for any of those four independent reasons. In my judgment, permitting these ATS claims to proceed jumps the rails of proper judicial restraint.”).

• Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (reasoning that plaintiffs lacked standing for their APA suit because they “have an adequate alternative judicial remedy, namely tax refund suits” and must file refund claims with the IRS before bringing suit to challenge the 2006 refund rules under the ripeness doctrine). [Joined by Judges Sentelle and Henderson.]

• Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“FOIA ordinarily cannot be used to obtain private information from law enforcement files relating to a criminal prosecution.”).

• Rattigan v. Holder, 643 F.3d 975 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Egan set forth a simple default rule for courts to follow in the absence of congressional direction otherwise. The complicated process ushered in by the majority opinion does not comport with the clarity of Egan, in my respectful judgment.”).

• United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (dissenting from a denial of rehearing en banc; “The defendant contended that the Fourth Amendment was violated not only by the police surveillance without a warrant (the issue addressed in the panel opinion) but also by the police’s initial installation of the GPS device on his car without a warrant.”).

• Howmet Corp. v. EPA, 614 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Of course, there is good reason the 1985 regulations did not go as far as EPA now wants to. Doing so would violate the text of RCRA, the governing statute, which as relevant here confines EPA’s authority to regulation of ‘discarded material.’ We have held that Congress intended the term ‘discarded material’ to carry its ‘ordinary, plain-English meaning’—namely, to cover only material that is ‘disposed of, thrown away, or abandoned.’”).

• Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The FCC’s exclusivity ban thus is no longer necessary to further competition. I would hold that the FCC’s exclusivity rule violates the First Amendment, and thus also violates the 1992 Cable Act as construed to conform to the First Amendment.”).

• Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“But we could line Constitution Avenue from this Courthouse to the IRS Building with judicial decisions that hold that challenges to tax laws and regulations must occur in refund suits. Those many decisions, in my judgment, establish a principle of judicial restraint that plainly covers this suit.”).

• FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. , 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“By seeking to block a merger without a sufficient showing that the merged entity could impose a significant and nontransitory price increase, the FTC’s position calls to mind the bad old days when mergers were viewed with suspicion regardless of their economic benefits. I would not turn back the clock.”).

• Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. , 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The Framers of our Constitution took great care to ensure that power in our system was separated into three Branches, not concentrated in the Legislative Branch; that there were checks and balances; and that one individual would be ultimately responsible and accountable for the exercise of executive power. The PCAOB contravenes those constitutional principles, as well as long-standing Supreme Court precedents, and it is therefore unconstitutional.”).

• Sierra Club v. EPA, 536 F.3d 673 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“I agree completely with the majority opinion about bedrock principles of statutory interpretation. Because petitioners’ other challenges are not persuasive, I would deny the petition in whole.”).

• United States v. Askew, 529 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“In analyzing whether the police here could unzip Askew’s jacket as a protective step to ensure officer safety, we are not limited to examining the officer’s subjective intent (which, according to the testimony, was to facilitate the show-up). Rather, we consider whether the officer had objectively reasonable grounds to unzip Askew’s jacket for purposes of officer safety.”).

• In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“In my judgment, the majority opinion illustrates the magnetic pull that the Guidelines still occasionally exert over appellate courts in cases involving sentences outside the Guidelines range.”).

• Noble v. Sombrotto, 525 F.3d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Our precedents and the statutory text and structure establish a basic principle of judicial restraint in these cases. When a union member sues union officers under § 501 and alleges that they violated the union constitution, we have held that the reviewing court owes ‘considerable deference’ to the officers’ interpretation of the constitution; we uphold their interpretation unless it is ‘unreasonable or made in bad faith.’”).

• Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Courts have incrementally expanded [] APA procedural requirements well beyond what the text provides …. The judicially created obstacle course can hinder Executive Branch agencies from rapidly and effectively responding to changing or emerging issues within their authority.”).

• Am. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“I would dismiss their lawsuit as unripe because the FCC, in a separate rulemaking proceeding, is re-examining these environmental issues and considering the effects of communications towers on birds nationwide …. This case is thus closely analogous to a situation in which a petitioner comes to court to challenge an agency order while the agency is still considering a petition for reconsideration. We routinely dismiss such cases.”).

• Agri. Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The majority opinion also relies on two House committee reports issued in connection with IRCA. The usual cautions apply to this kind of legislative history: Committee reports are highly manipulable, often unknown by most Members of Congress and by the President, and thus ordinarily unreliable as an expression of statutory ‘intent.’”).

• Sims v. Johnson, 505 F.3d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Parties may not wriggle out of a contract simply because of subsequent tax law developments or because they failed to anticipate tax consequences when forming the agreement.”).

• Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. , 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Courts are not well-equipped to determine on their own whether a particular civil case would have a negative impact on U.S. foreign policy and should be dismissed. The majority opinion’s rejection of the definitive and reasoned Executive Branch statement about this lawsuit’s negative impact on America’s prosecution of an ongoing war does not reflect the judicial restraint and deference that the Supreme Court and this Court have required.”)
 
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