https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_Cox#Response_to_the_beginning_of_the_2008_U.S._Recession
Response to the beginning of the 2008 U.S. Recession[edit]
Further information: Late 2000s recession
Cox, Hank Paulson, and Ben Bernanke watch as President George W. Bush delivers a statement on the economy in 2008
Under his leadership, the SEC on September 17 and 18, 2008, imposed a variety of both permanent and emergency restrictions on short selling in response to the liquidity crisis.[97] Abusive naked short selling, in which the seller intentionally fails to deliver the shares sold short in time for settlement, was banned outright, an exception for options market makers that had been in place for several years was eliminated,[98] and a new anti-fraud provision, Rule 10b-21, was adopted to give specific enforcement authority in such cases.[99] In September 2008, short selling of 799 financial stocks was temporarily curtailed[97] in response to rumors accompanied by heightened short selling activity in the shares of major financial institutions.
On September 26, 2008, Cox ended the 2004 program for voluntary regulation of investment bank holding companies, begun under SEC Chairman William Donaldson and then-Director of Market Regulation (later SEC Commissioner) Annette Nazareth. The program "was fundamentally flawed from the beginning, because investment banks could opt in or out of supervision voluntarily," Cox said.[100] A critical report by the SEC inspector general that evaluated the program in light of the Bear Stearns near-failure in March 2008 found that while "Bear Stearns was compliant with the capital and liquidity requirements" at the time of its acquisition, "its collapse raises serious questions about the adequacy of these requirements." However, according to the Inspector General, his report "did not include a determination of the cause of Bear Stearns' collapse" or determine "whether any of these issues directly contributed to Bear Stearns' collapse." On that subject, the report stated, "we have no evidence linking these significant deficiencies with the cause of Bear Stearns' collapse."[101][102] Cox criticized the oversight program on the ground that because of its voluntary nature and the SEC's limited statutory authority, the agency could not force changes in the hundreds of unregulated subsidiaries of large investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns as bank regulators could do with bank holding companies. In testimony before Congress on several occasions in 2008, he asked for statutory authority to regulate investment bank holding companies.[103]
In addition to the fact that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act did not give the SEC the authority to regulate large investment bank holding companies, Cox noted that investors were vulnerable to other regulatory gaps such as the fact that the $60 trillion market for credit default swaps was then completely unregulated. "Neither the SEC nor any regulator has authority even to require minimum disclosure", he said.[100] In testimony and public statements he urged Congress to enact remedial legislation.[104]
Cox said that during the buildup of the credit crisis, when the credit rating agencies were still unregulated, they gave top credit ratings to financial instruments which packaged risky loans and spread the negative impacts of the credit crisis more broadly throughout the markets.[105] Following the first-time SEC registration of the credit rating agencies in September 2007 under newly enacted legislative authority, he ordered a 10-month examination of the three major rating agencies that uncovered significant weaknesses in their ratings practices for mortgage-backed securities and that called into question the impartiality of their ratings. The results were reported to Congress in July 2008.[106] The SEC immediately commenced a rulemaking which concluded on December 3, 2008 with approval of a series of measures to regulate the conflicts of interests, disclosures, internal policies, and business practices of credit rating agencies. The regulations were intended to ensure that firms provide more meaningful ratings and greater disclosure to investors concerning collateralized debt obligations and residential mortgage-backed securities.[107]
In an interview with the Washington Post in late December 2008, Cox said, "What we have done in this current turmoil is stay calm, which has been our greatest contribution—not being impulsive, not changing the rules willy-nilly, but going through a very professional and orderly process that takes into account unintended consequences and gives ample notice to market participants." Cox added that the Commission's decision to impose a three-week ban on short selling of financial company stocks was taken reluctantly, but that the view at the time, including from Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson and Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, was that "if we did not act and act at that instant, these financial institutions could fail as a result and there would be nothing left to save."[108] In a December 2008 interview with Reuters, he explained that the SEC's Office of Economic Analysis was still evaluating data from the temporary ban, and that preliminary findings pointed to several unintended market consequences and side effects. "While the actual effects of this temporary action will not be fully understood for many more months, if not years ... knowing what we know now, I believe on balance the Commission would not do it again."[109]
Cox stepped down as Chairman of the SEC at the end of the Bush administration, on January 20, 2009.