Socialism isn't growth.
Nope. He caused a normal depression to become the Great Depression, which lasted until both FDR and Truman left office. It took Eisenhower 2 full years to recover.
Nope. NAZI Germany left people starving, jailed, or roasted in ovens.
Nope. That was capitalism.
Nope. That was capitalism.
Nope. They are still in poverty. Their 'growth' was massive spending by the Chinese government, using money they did not have. It's falling apart now. We could easily see another series of revolution after revolution in China soon.
This article puts FDR #1 for economic growth of ALL Presidents.
https://5minuteeconomist.com/which-presidents-were-best-and-worst-for-the-us-economy.html
But, but, but he caused the Great Depression, no he did not, you Libertarians are just dumb goofs.
Yes, Japan's economic miracle & the Spanish Miracle were both were Socialist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_economic_miracle
Influence of governmental policies: Ikeda administration and keiretsu
In 1954, the economic system MITI had cultivated from 1949 to 1953 came into full effect. Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, who Johnson[who?] calls "the single most important individual architect of the Japanese economic miracle," pursued a policy of heavy industrialization.[citation needed] This policy led to the emergence of 'over-loaning' (a practice that continues today) in which the Bank of Japan issues loans to city banks who in turn issue loans to industrial conglomerates. Since there was a shortage of capital in Japan at the time, industrial conglomerates borrowed beyond their capacity to repay, often beyond their net worth, causing city banks in turn to over-borrow from the Bank of Japan. This gave the national Bank of Japan complete control over dependent local banks.
The system of over-loaning, combined with the government's relaxation of anti-monopoly laws (a remnant of SCAP control) also led to the re-emergence of conglomerate groups called keiretsu that mirrored the wartime conglomerates, or zaibatsu. Led by the economic improvements of Sony businessmen Masaru Ibuka and Akio Morita, the keiretsu efficiently allocated resources and became competitive internationally.[14]
At the heart of the keiretsu conglomerates' success lay city banks, which lent generously, formalizing cross-share holdings in diverse industries. The keiretsu spurred both horizontal and vertical integration, locking out foreign companies from Japanese industries. Keiretsu had close relations with MITI and each other through the cross-placement of shares, providing protection from foreign take-overs. For example, 83% of Japan's Development Bank's finances went toward strategic industries: shipbuilding, electric power, coal and steel production.[15] Keiretsu proved crucial to protectionist measures that shielded Japan's sapling economy.
Keiretsu also fostered an attitude shift among Japanese managers that tolerated low profits in the short-run because keiretsu were less concerned with increasing stock dividends and profits and more concerned about interest payments. Approximately only two-thirds of the shares of a given company were traded, cushioning keiretsu against market fluctuations and allowing keiretsu managers to plan for the long-term and maximize market shares instead of focusing on short-term profits.
The Ikeda administration also instituted the Foreign Exchange Allocation Policy, a system of import controls designed to prevent the flooding of Japan's markets by foreign goods. MITI used the foreign exchange allocation to stimulate the economy by promoting exports, managing investment and monitoring production capacity. In 1953, MITIs revised the Foreign Exchange Allocation Policy to promote domestic industries and increase the incentive for exports by revising the export-link system. A later revision based production capacity on foreign exchange allocation to prevent foreign dumping.
https://www.researchgate.net/public...lans_and_Regional_Industrialization_1950-1975
economists have attributed the gravity of each crisis to some of the endogenous factors that sustained the growth pattern of the boom years. While in 2011 the blame for the fall and stagnation of GDP was laid squarely at the door of the ‘brick economy’ and high private and business debt,2 the depth of the economic downturn of 1978 was attributed to liabilities accumulated during years of frenzied pursuit of economic development. The key factor is identified as the combined effect of a dictatorship applying ineffective government interventionism, while shying away from basic structural reforms and enforcing industrial policy that resulted in an inefficient economy that was highly sensitive to international market trends.3 In short, the state and industrialization played key roles in defining the kind of economic miracle that took place in Spain between 1950 and 1975 and the years of deep and prolonged crisis that have followed.
https://www.tutor2u.net/history/reference/economic-development-in-spain-1956-75
he Stabilisation Plan (1959)
The Stabilisation Plan represented the first attempt to liberalise and internationalise the Spanish economy. It effectively ended the failed corporatist economic system whilst also abandoning the policy of autarky:
Trade restrictions were lifted to encourage international trade
Government spending reduced to help lower inflation
Government control over prices was lifted
Initially, the Stabilisation Plan caused Spain's economic problems to deepen. Cuts to government spending caused a rise in unemployment and the lifting of price controls resulted in higher levels of inflation. However, after an initial recession the Spanish economy soon began to grow rapidly. Through the 1960s, Spain had the second fastest growing non-communist economy in the world.
Foreign Investment
The abandonment of autarky and the lifting of trade restrictions encouraged foreign investment into the Spanish economy to the tune of $7.6 billion between 1960-74. The USA accounted for almost half of this investment. As a result, Spain's car and electronics industries were able to modernise quickly.
The Growth of Tourism
Spain's economic boom was in part due to the growth of its tourism industry. In 1959, 4 million tourists were contributed approximately $130 million to the Spanish economy. By 1975, there were more than 30 million tourists annually contributing around $3.5 billion to Spain's national income. The growth in tourism created jobs in the hotel and construction industries, lifted living standards in Spain's coastal towns and brought many Spanish workers out of poverty.
Emergence of a Consumer Economy
As wages and production increased, a consumer economy began to emerge in Spain for the first time. Average incomes almost tripled in the 1960s meaning more Spaniards could afford household appliances such as washing machines and electronic fridges as well as luxuries like televisions and cars. The economic boom didn't benefit everybody, however. Free-market reforms caused rising levels of inequality in income and wealth. For example, provinces such as Badajoz in the south-west and Granada had per-capita incomes that were less than half of some areas in the Basque region.
Wider impacts of Spain's economic transformation:
Welfare - the provision of social welfare dramatically improved. By 1974, 79% of Spaniards were covered by social welfare, up from just 29% in 1950.
Healthcare provision was also extended. Obligatory Health Insurance was introduced in 1963 to cover all Spanish workers against illness or injury. The number of doctors per head of the population also increased. Better healthcare provision had the wider impact of reducing infant mortality rates as well as increasing the average life expectancy from 62 in 1950 to 73 in 1975.
Education received extra funding as having a skilled workforce would encourage further foreign direct investment. Illiteracy rates dropped and the number of Spanish universities had almost doubled by 1974.
https://europeansworldwide.wordpress.com/2018/06/23/the-spanish-miracle/
There was massive government investment in key state-owned companies like the national industrial conglomerate Instituto Nacional de Industria, the mass market car company SEAT in Barcelona and the shipbuilder Empresa Nacional Bazán.
These companies led the industrialisation of Spain, restoring the prosperity of industrial areas like Barcelona and Bilbao and creating new industrial areas. These enterprises remained under state control.
The automotive industry was one of the most powerful accelerants of the Spanish Miracle. In 1946 there were only 72,000 private cars in Spain, in 1966 there were over 1 million.
Someday when you are older and brighter the light will come on for you. Hopefully anyway.