Into the Night
Contributor
Look what up, Pretender?
Miami plane crash latest
- Thread starter T. A. Gardner
- Start date
I never said that. What we do not know is what happened with the controls. What we do know is what happened with the plane.
Into the Night
Contributor
Argument from randU fallacies. Random numbers are not data, Wally.
Into the Night
Contributor
The aircraft landed too fast and too far down the runway to stop.
The fast landing also prevented the speed brakes or the thrust reversers to deploy.
He was already too slow to get back in the air again using the remaining runway.
The outcome is certain, Wally.
T. A. Gardner
Serial Thread Killer
That's what it looks like to me. They made a shit landing, then realized they'd made a shit landing. They then decided to go around but then decided they couldn't go around, and that ended up in the clusterfuck of them crashing like they did. Something like this:
Walt’s claim in post 7101186:
He’s walking back the earlier “nobody knows what the pilot did” line and splitting aircraft motion from control inputs.
Assessment
The distinction doesn’t hold the way he draws it.
The flight data recorder is a record of what happened with the controls, at the airplane-system level. NTSB already briefed those traces, not just “the plane went off the end.”
Public FDR points that are control/system states, not just path:
- When gear compressed (asymmetric: nose + right first, left later)
- When wheel brakes were applied, released, then applied again
- Throttle positions moving to values consistent with go-around thrust, then back to idle
- No recorded deployment of speed brakes or thrust reversers
That is control-position and system-command data. It is not “we only know what the airframe did in space.” Video shows the jet’s path; the FDR shows brake and thrust commands and whether high-lift/drag devices moved.
Into the Night
Contributor
I know exactly what the pilot did, Wally.
He landed too fast and too far down the runway to stop or to take off again.
Into the Night
Contributor
There ARE detailed videos, Wally.
@Walt's claim that "we do not know what happened with the controls” isn't correct, after the Tuesday FDR briefing.
His follow-on post (#64) that “the fast landing also prevented the speed brakes or the thrust reversers to deploy” and that a go-around was already impossible is also not an NTSB conclusion.
Those are inferences. High energy and late touchdown make a stop and a late go-around both ugly; the recorders have not been used to close either mechanism.
His follow-on post (#64) that “the fast landing also prevented the speed brakes or the thrust reversers to deploy” and that a go-around was already impossible is also not an NTSB conclusion.
Those are inferences. High energy and late touchdown make a stop and a late go-around both ugly; the recorders have not been used to close either mechanism.
Into the Night
Contributor
Amazon did not subcontract the aircraft or the pilots. It owned the aircraft.
Into the Night
Contributor
DON'T TRY TO DENY YOUR OWN POSTS, WALLY!
It is known what happened with the controls and the plane.
T. A. Gardner
Serial Thread Killer
He had the speed at the halfway point, when the wheels still weren't down, to do a go around and regain flight. But they chose to continue the landing instead.
Into the Night
Contributor
No, he didn't. Once the plane touches the ground, it takes space to accelerate again to fly. The wheels didn't have full weight on them, but the plane was touching the ground. That's enough.
He was out of space. He had no room to accelerate again or to stop. The outcome was certain.
The time to decide to go around is BEFORE the wheels touch the ground.
The speed brakes and the thrust reversers did not deploy.
Pilot error, and possible factors as equipment failures; but in the end it was pilot error as the primary fault.
The NTSB will determine if there are other factors, but attempting the landing too fast and too far down the runway is the initial fault. Pilot error.
The big update landed Wednesday, 9 September: NTSB released a CVR summary after interviewing both pilots. Full verbatim transcript is still later. Cause is still not official.
One pilot repeatedly warned they were too fast for about 1 minute 42 seconds through the approach and after touchdown. NTSB: the other pilot did not give a consistent verbal response to those speed calls. The agency did not say which seat made the calls.
Automated warnings in the last minute:
Configuration was late: flaps 30 called very close to the ground (~40 ft / ~10 seconds before the sounds of touchdown in some summaries).
About 15 seconds before the recording ended, one pilot called for a go-around as throttles went to go-around thrust; throttles were pulled to idle again a few seconds later. Sounds consistent with leaving the paved surface follow.
That lines up with Tuesday’s FDR: late/asymmetric touchdown, brakes on then off, go-around thrust then idle, no recorded speed-brake or reverser deployment.
Walt’s “we don’t know what happened with the controls” is weaker than it was.
We now have both FDR control traces and CVR evidence of speed callouts, missing consistent response, GPWS alerts, a late flaps-30 call, and a verbal go-around after the airplane was already on the runway. That is still not a probable-cause finding, and it does not name who was PF/PM. It is no longer an empty record.
Gardner’s “they didn’t commit to a go-around in time” is more consistent with the public record than it was on Tuesday, but “the pilots fucked up, it’s that simple” is still ahead of NTSB. CRM breakdown + unstable approach is now a live investigative track, not a rumor.
New cockpit-voice points
One pilot repeatedly warned they were too fast for about 1 minute 42 seconds through the approach and after touchdown. NTSB: the other pilot did not give a consistent verbal response to those speed calls. The agency did not say which seat made the calls.
Automated warnings in the last minute:
- “Sink rate” (twice)
- “Too low, terrain” (multiple times; reports say four or five)
Configuration was late: flaps 30 called very close to the ground (~40 ft / ~10 seconds before the sounds of touchdown in some summaries).
About 15 seconds before the recording ended, one pilot called for a go-around as throttles went to go-around thrust; throttles were pulled to idle again a few seconds later. Sounds consistent with leaving the paved surface follow.
That lines up with Tuesday’s FDR: late/asymmetric touchdown, brakes on then off, go-around thrust then idle, no recorded speed-brake or reverser deployment.
Status as of Thursday 10 Sept
- Pilots were interviewed Wednesday as planned.
- CVR summary is out; full transcript is not.
- Preliminary report still expected on the usual ~30-day clock; final report much later.
- Airport ops still recovering; at least one runway had reopened after evidence work.
Bearing on the forum fight
Walt’s “we don’t know what happened with the controls” is weaker than it was.
We now have both FDR control traces and CVR evidence of speed callouts, missing consistent response, GPWS alerts, a late flaps-30 call, and a verbal go-around after the airplane was already on the runway. That is still not a probable-cause finding, and it does not name who was PF/PM. It is no longer an empty record.
Gardner’s “they didn’t commit to a go-around in time” is more consistent with the public record than it was on Tuesday, but “the pilots fucked up, it’s that simple” is still ahead of NTSB. CRM breakdown + unstable approach is now a live investigative track, not a rumor.
That is false on both halves.
Who actually had what
- Operator / certificate / crew: 21 Air LLC (Greensboro, NC). FAA and Amazon both identified the flight as 21 Air operating for Amazon Prime Air. The captain and FO worked for 21 Air, not Amazon. Amazon does not hold the Part 121 certificate for this network.
- Registered owner of N1997A: Andromeda Leasing II LLC, Purchase, NY — an Atlas Air Worldwide address/affiliate, not Amazon.
- Brand / customer: Amazon Prime Air livery (“Amazon One”). Amazon sources and uses a large contracted 767 fleet. Branding ≠ ownership or operational control.
So Scholl’s “subcontracting to tier-3 operators” description matches the public structure. The forum claim that Amazon owned the jet and did not subcontract aircraft or pilots does not.
Amazon can still be a defendant in civil suits (one widow’s filing already names Amazon, 21 Air, lessors, and both pilots). That is liability theory, not the same as “Amazon owned the airplane and employed the crew.” Operational control for the NTSB/FAA inquiry starts with 21 Air.
T. A. Gardner
Serial Thread Killer
The wheels weren't on the ground at that point, and they had flight speed, because the wheels weren't on the ground among other things. Applying full power and going to flaps 20 would have put them back in the air almost immediately.
Captain Steeeve just walked the NTSB timeline on the Miami Amazon crash , 21 Air Flight 7598.Late configuration. Speed warnings. GPWS alerts. Touchdown at 158 knots. Go-around called when they were already off the runway.He says there were 11 points where a go-around was mandatory...That “11” is his count, not the NTSB’s.Investigators still have not said who was flying and have not released the pilot interviews....
View: https://x.com/ZachBitango/status/2098276959696380372
View: https://x.com/ZachBitango/status/2098276959696380372
After seeing tens of thousands of arrivals (and departures) on the arrival and departure radar and from the tower cab, it appears that the plane landed long and at rollout, there was insufficient runway left for a safe landing.
If the runway had ILS, the Glideslope could be involved but from the news reports, it appears it was a VFR approach and not an IFR approach.
It appears to be pilot/s error but the NTSB will determine this.
If the runway had ILS, the Glideslope could be involved but from the news reports, it appears it was a VFR approach and not an IFR approach.
It appears to be pilot/s error but the NTSB will determine this.